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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA GLENN PRATT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14469

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract action arising out of
respondent's employment with the appellant school district.
Respondent is seeking recovery of salary and benefits and
reinstatement as a tenured teacher in the appellant's
employ.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury and the lower Court, the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding entered judgment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the Special Verdict on January 2 8, 19 76, awarding respondent $18,0 70.03 in damages and further ordering that
he be reinstated as a tenured employee of the appellant
school district.

Post-judgment motions were made and the

matter was appealed to this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is a tenured school teacher, qualified to
teach in the intermediate elementary grades, 5 and 6.
(R. 107). He began his employment with the appellant in
19 59 and taught at the Whiterocks school in the Uintah
District until the end of the school year in the spring
of 1973.

(Tr. pp. 27, 28).

In the fall of 19 72 the appellant determined to close
the school at Whiterocks where respondent had been teaching
and transfer the students to the Todd Elementary school in
nearby Roosevelt, Utah.

(Tr. pp. 29, 78). On or about

March 23, 19 73, the Superintendent of the appellant,
Mr. Ashel Evans, met with respondent and other teachers
of the Whiterocks school.

(Tr. p. 78). At this meeting,
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Mr. Evans explained to the respondent and the other teachers
that the school would be closing at the end of the school
year and that if any of them desired to teach elsewhere
in the district they should inform the appellant of their
intent in writing.

(Tr. p. 78).

On or about April 1, 19 73, respondent sent a letter
to appellant requesting a teaching position at the Todd
Elementary School in Roosevelt.

(Tr. p. 32, Ex. 1). Later,

in late April or early May of 19 73 Superintendent Evans
returned to the Whiterocks school to discuss the teaching
assignment requests of the individual teachers.

(Tr. pp.

35, 79). During this second visit by Superintendent Evans,
a conversation was held between him and respondent.

(Id.).

In this conversation Superintendent Evans expressed some
concern to respondent regarding his ability to teach in
the Todd School because new team-teaching methods were
being utilized at that school.

(Tr. p. 80). At this sug-

gestion by Superintendent Evans, respondent became somewhat
incensed and told him that if the district didn't want him,
he didn't want to work for the district.
80).

(Tr. pp. 35, 46,

Superintendent Evans then asked respondent if he was

resigning and he said that he was.

(Tr. p. 80)
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Respondent

denies making the statement concerning resignation.

(Tr.

pp. 35, 36) .
Subsequent to this second meeting, Superintendent Evans
was under the distinct impression that respondent had resigned his job effective at the close of the school year.
(Tr. p. 80). Accordingly, the appellant proceeded to fill
the vacancy left by respondent's resignation.

(Tr. p. 81).

The resignation of respondent was not unusual, because
other teachers at the Whiterocks school had also resigned
rather than teach elsewhere in the District.

(Tr. p. 82).

At no time did respondent withdraw his resignation,
nor did he apply for a new contract for the coming school
year.

(Id.).

In the summer of 1973 the respondent applied

for a teaching position with the Duchesne County School
District.

(Tr. pp. 46, 4 7).

Apparently, respondent was

not given an offer of employment by the Duchesne District
\

and on August 14, 19 73, respondent sent a letter to Appellant requesting a hearing on his termination.

(R. p. 145).

A hearing was held on September 5, 19 73, and respondent appeared, bringing witnesses who testified in his behalf.
(Tr. p. 112-114).

|

On September 24, 1973, respondent wrote

I
to the appellant and demanded reinstatement.

This demand
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was declined by appellant by letter dated September 25,
1973.

(R. p. 145). The instant action was filed on

April 24, 1974.

(R. p. 1)•

When this action was filed it included as defendants
the individual members of the school board.
It was later dismissed as to them.

(R. p. 1-7) .

(R. p. 58). The com-

plaint initially alleged two theories, i.e. breach of contract and violation of the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act.

(R. p. 1-7). However, at the beginning of

trial, respondent's counsel withdrew all claims under that
Act.

(Tr. p. 2). Respondent's counsel also stipulated

that there had been no attempt whatsoever to comply with
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
(Tr. p. 2). Appellant claimed in its answer and has preserved throughout the record its defense of non-compliance
by respondent with the provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

(R. p. 95; Tr. p. 149).

The case was tried to a jury on December 10 and 11,
1975.

The sole question submitted to the jury was whether

respondent had voluntarily resigned.

In response to this

interrogatory the jury found that he had not.

(R. p. 242).

The court held that damages were simply a matter of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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computation and therefore fixed them as a matter of law.
The court also ordered appellant to reinstate the respondent as its employee at the same position of tenure and
salary as he would have been had his employment not terminated.

(R. p. 269, 270).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT, §63-30-1, ET SEQ., UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (19 53, AS AMENDED).

Through the course of this litigation and up until the
time of trial, respondent claimed a breach of contract and
a violation by appellant of the provisions of the Utah
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, §§53-51-1, et
seq.

Just prior to trial, however, respondent abandoned

his claim against appellant for violation of the Orderly
Termination Procedures Act, and he also stipulated on the
record that there had been no attempt whatever to comply
with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The record reads as follows:
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The Court:
Now Mr. Lybbert, you had
you asked Mr. Dibblee to
garding, and Mr. Dibblee
he didn't see any reason
ahead.

a matter that
stipulate reindicated that
why not—go

Mr. Lybbert:
I understand that the plaintiff is
willing to stipulate that they have
not proceeded or intended to proceed
under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act and have not attempted nor have
they complied with the notice provisions of that act.
Mr. Dibblee:
I understand that's correct.
Mr. Lybbert:
No. 2: I understand from our previous
conversation that you are not making
any claim under the provisions of the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Section 53-51-1, et seq.
Mr. Dibblee:
That's correct.
(Tr. p. 2). The question before the court is thus whether
compliance with the provisions of said Act is necessary
in a breach of contract action.
In the case of Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Ut.2d 291, 495
P.2d 814 (1972), this court specifically addressed that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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question.

The Baugh case was an action for specific per-

formance on a real estate contract existing between Mr. and
Mrs. Baugh and the City of Logan.

The trial court granted

Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed.

This Court affirmed, holding that there

was insufficient part performance to justify granting the
remedy of specific performance, and further holding that the
plaintiffs1 failure to comply with the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred their claim for
damages.

In so holding this Court stated:

"Finally plaintiffs contend that the trial
court erred in its determination that Section
63-30-13 applies to a cause of action based
on contract.
"Section 63-30-13 provides:
A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred
unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety days after the cause
of action arises, . . .
"Section 63-30-2(5) provides:
The word 'claim1 shall mean any
r
claim brought against a governmental entity or employees as permitted by this act;
"Section 63-30-5 provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to
any contractual obligation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v

Since an action on a contractual obligation
is a claim permitted under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, notice of such claim
must be filed in accordance with Section
63-30-13." 495 P.2d at 817.
In 1975 the legislature amended Section 63-30-5 to
provide that in actions arising out of contractual obligations, claimants needn't comply with the requirements of
Sections 63-30-12, 13 and 19. However, said amendment did
not become effective until May 13, 19 75, nearly a year after
the instant action was filed, and two years after the controlling facts of this case occurred.
The Baugh case clearly holds that in contract actions
against a governmental entity arising prior to May 13, 1975,
the notice provisions of Section 6 3-30-13 must be complied
with or the claim is barred.

By amending Section 63-30-5,

the legislature implicitly recognized that prior to the
amendment the provisions of Sections 63-30-12, 13 and 19
were applicable to claims arising out of contract. Otherwise, the amendment of section five would have been a
superflous act of futility and of no practical effect.
Such intent may not be imputed to legislative actions.
Respondent has stipulated that there was no attempt
by him to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consequently, no claim was ever filed.

Actual notice of

facts giving rise to a claim are insufficient to comply,
a written claim must be filed.

Scarborough v. Granite School

District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah, 1975); Varoz v. Sevy, 29 Ut.2d
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d
476 (Utah, 1975).

Since the Baugh case holds that compli-

ance in a contract action is necessary, herefore, plaintiff's claim is barred as a matter of law.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES AND REINSTATE RESPONDENT IN ITS EMPLOY.
A.

NO MUTUALITY OF PERFORMANCE.
It has long been the law that when specific performance

of a contract is requested as a remedy, it may be granted
only if it is mutually available to both parties to the contract.

Furthermore, specific performance is not available

if damages provide an adequate remedy.
The general rule in this regard is stated in 71 Am.Jur.
2d, Specific Performance, §166 (1973), as follows:
[T]he rule that specific performance of contracts
for personal services will not be granted ordinarily extends to cases where the party who was,
by the terms of the contract, to render services
is the plaintiff. Equity will not as a general
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rule compel the performance of an executory
contract of services at the instance of the
party who was to perform the services, . . .
* * *

Under the general rule, a court will not entertain a suit for specific performance of a contract in which the plaintiff's executory
undertaking is to render personal services
in a continuing employment or office, especially if he may quit the employment at any time.
In accord with the foregoing general statement of the
law is Annotation, 22 ALR 2d 508, 540, §13, (1952), where
it is stated:
Under the general rule a court will not entertain a suit for specific performance of a
contract in which the plaintiff's executory
undertaking is to render personal services
in a continuing employment or office, or to
employ the defendant in such an employment
or office.
Especially is this so if the party may
quit the employment at any time. (Emphasis
added).
The Utah courts have recognized and adopted the majority
position on the law as quoted above.

In Halloran-Judge Trust

Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927), the plaintiff requested the court to specifically enforce a building
management contract between a deceased party for whom it
was acting as executor and the defendant.

The lower court,

sitting without a jury declined to enforce the contract and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the plaintiff appealed.

Ruling on the issue of specific

performance, this court held:
Inasmuch as we are compelled to hold that the
contract is merely one for services to be
rendered, for which the compensation is expressly stated in the contract itself, we are
of opinion it is not a case in which equitable
relief can be granted. For instance, let us
reverse the situation and assume that plaintiff
had breached the contract by refusing to perform the service. In such case could plaintiff, at the instance of respondents, be
compelled by a court of equity to specifically
perform the service? We think not. If plaintiff could not be compelled defendants cannot
be compelled. There must be mutuality or
specific performance, ordinarily, will not be
enforced. (Emphasis added).
* * *

Hence, we are of opinion if plaintiff is entitled to any relief it can only be obtained
in an action at law. The present value of
the contract is easily assertainable. The
compensation is definitely fixed, and the
expense incident to performing the service,
in view of plaintiff's experience in the
service thus far performed, can be approximately determined. As far as these features
are concerned it appears to be a typical case
for relief in an action at law. 258 Pac.
at 348.
Appellant is not unaware that the mutuality requirement
for specific performance has fallen by the wayside where
certain types of contracts are concerned.

See, e.g. Genola

Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930 (1938).
However, in the area of personal service contracts such as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the one at issue here, the rule remains viable—and for
good reason.

As noted in Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5A,

§1204 (1951, and supplement), there are three basic reasons
why personal service contracts are not specifically enforced:
(1) Difficulty of enforcing the decree; (2) violation of
constitutional guarantees against involuntary servitude;
(3) fosters a continuing undesirable relationship between
employer and employee.

In this regard, Professor Corbin

further notes that:
The foregoing reasons will usually be found to
be equally applicable as against specific enforcement of the promise of an employer to
retain another in his service as to such enforcement against the servant or employee. . . .
Neither of the two parties will be compelled to
maintain the undesirable personal relations
that performance of the contract requires.
Id. at p. 401-402.
The reasoning of Professor Corbin in this respect is
persuasive.

It is one thing to compel a manufacturer to

supply widgets to a customer, while quite another to compel
employer and employee to remain indefinitely in an undesirable personal association.
As noted in the case of Greene v. Howard University,
271 F.Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967):
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A contract to hire a teacher may not be enforced
by specific performance. It is not within those
few categories of agreements that are enforceable in equity. It would be intolerable for
the courts to interject themselves and to require an educational institution to hire or to
maintain on its staff a professor or instructor
whom it deemed undesirable and did not wish to
employ. For the courts to impose such a requirement would be an interference with the
operation of institutions of higher learning
contrary to established principles of law and
to the best traditions of education. 271
F.Supp. at 615.
This is particularly so when damages constitute a perfectly
adequate remedy for the plaintiff.
In the instant case the respondent has been awarded
a judgment for damages to the date of trial, and he apparently felt that they constituted an adequate remedy to
that point.

The respondent's contract was sufficiently

precise in its terms to enable computation of damages very
simply.

Thus it cannot be gainsaid that damages do not

constitute an adequate remedy in this action.
The respondent is not entitled to specific performance
of the contract which he alleges. Not only is the contract
one for personal services, not subject to specific performance, but the respondent has a perfectly adequate remedy
at law for damages.

It is true that respondent did not
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claim damages past the date of trial in his complaint,
nevertheless, he could easily have done so. As a matter
of law, respondent1s only remedy was a legal remedy for
damages.
B.

Specific performance will not lie.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT JUDGMENT.
In his complaint, respondent alleges that the terms

of his employment contract require that appellant hire him
as a teacher in the district before consideration is given
to hiring of non-tenured teachers.

(R. 1-7). The alleged

contract language relating to preference status in hiring
was never received as evidence and was thus never available
for the judge or jury to consider.

(Tr. pp. 58, 114).

The contract itself (Ex. p. 7) did not contain any terms
relating to renewal or preference in hiring.

It was thus

the burden of respondent to come forward with competent
evidence of the contractual terms which entitled him to
specific performance and damages beyond the contract term.
This respondent failed to do.

He failed to show that he

was entitled to have his contract renewed or that the contractual terms mandated a renewal.

In effect, respondent

proved that a contract existed for the 1972-73 school year
but totally failed to prove what the terms of that contract
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were.

Consequently, respondent is not entitled to either

specific performance of said contract, or damages for breach
which extend beyond the end of the 19 72-73 school year, i.e.
the contract term.

Respondent must prove that his contract

would have and should have been renewed for the ensuing
years in order to request relief from the court extending
beyond the initial contract term.

This respondent totally

and completely failed to accomplish.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE
ISSUE OF DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The lower court ruled that damages in this action were
merely a matter of computation and thus were for the court
to decide.

(Tr. p. 146, 147). Appellant excepted to the

action of the court in this regard because respondent had
failed to come forward with any evidence to show that he
had made a reasonable effort to seek other remunerative
employment and mitigate his damages.

(Tr. p. 149). Thus,

a jury question existed as to whether respondent had made
a reasonable attempt to mitigate his damages.

In other

words, the jury should have been allowed to decide whether
the efforts made by respondent in seeking and obtaining
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other employment were reasonable in light of the evidence
adduced and the reason and experience of the jury.
The law of this state is that the plaintiff in a lawsuit has the duty to go forward and produce evidence on a
given point sufficient to establish, prima facie, that it
is fact.

Kartchner v. H o m e , 1 Ut.2d 112, 262 P.2d 749

(1953).

Further, the burden of producing evidence does

not shift to the defendant until the plaintiff has fulfilled
his duty in this regard.

Id.

A plaintiff who is claiming damages for lost earnings
has a duty to find other employment and mitigate his damage.
The general rule on this point is stated in Morrison v. Perry,
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943), as follows:
Every party must "exercise reasonable care and
diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen
the resulting damage, and to the extent that his
damages are the result of his active and unreasonable enhancement thereof or are due to his
failure to exercise such care and diligence, he
cannot recover. 140 P.2d at 780. (Emphasis
added).
To the same effect are Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 78
Utah 564, 6 P.2d 171 (1931) and Casey v. Nelson Bros.
Constr. Co., 24 Ut.2d 14, 465 P.2d 173 (1970).
Annotation, 44 ALR 3d 629, 679, §31 (1972).
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See also,

Mitigation of damages is a duty incumbent upon a plaintiff and is not in the nature of an affirmative defense.
See Spruce Equipment Co. v. Maloney, 527 P.2d 1295 (Alaska,
19 74).

Consequently, the burden of initially coming for-

ward with evidence to show reasonable mitigation falls on
the plaintiff.
In the instant case respondent made no attempt whatever to show the efforts he made to obtain other employment
or even if he obtained other employment.

Check stubs showing

his actual earnings since terminating with appellant were
introduced into evidence, but nothing more was said.
pp. 39, 40; Exhibits 3 and 4).

(Tr.

At the very least, respon-

dent should have been required to show that under all the
circumstances his earnings for 19 74 and 19 75 were reasonable.
Here no evidence was ever offered.

And certainly, the docu-

ments themselves do not bespeak reasonableness.
Respondent in this case has completely failed to meet
his initial burden of coming forward with evidence to show
that he used reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages.

{

Therefore, appellant was not required to present rebuttal
evidence on mitigation because the burden had never shifted.
i

This being the case, the matter of damages should have been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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submitted to the jury in accordance with appellant's requested Instruction No. 8, for them to decide whether respondent acted reasonably in mitigating his damages.

Moreover,

even if respondent had met his burden of showing prima facie
mitigation of damages, the jury should have been allowed to
hear evidence from appellant and decide the factual question
of whether respondent's efforts were reasonable.

As it is,

respondent presented no evidence on mitigation.

Thus appel-

lant was not required to present rebuttal or to cross examine
the witnesses in this respect.

Therefore, the matter should

have been submitted to the jury with an appropriate instruction as requested by appellant.

Appellant had a right to

argue respondent's obvious failure to produce any evidence
of mitigation.

Failure of the lower court to so proceed is

error.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has stipulated on the record before this
court that no attempt whatsoever was made to comply with the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
was tried solely on a breach of contract theory.

The case
The law

of this state in effect at the time respondent's claim arose
clearly provided that respondent's failure to give notice
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of the claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act was necessary in a breach of contract action.

His

failure to so comply bars his claim as a matter of law.
The relief granted by the lower court in this case was
erroneous because specific performance is not available
as a remedy in a suit for breach of a personal services
contract and because damages were awarded for a period beyond
the contract term without any proof that respondent was
entitled to be rehired or to have his contract renewed.
Finally, the lower court erred in failing to submit
the damage issue to the jury for them to decide whether
respondent had acted reasonably in mitigating his damages.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 5 21-9 000

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of
the foregoing brief to counsel for respondent, Michael T.
McCoy, 414 Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
si*

this ^

~~~ day of May, 1976.

/?.^&S(

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

